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Firing Blanks: Louisiana’s New Right to Bear Arms
INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 2012, a young man gunned down 20 students
and six faculty members of Sandy Hook Elementary School in
Newtown, Connecticut, before taking his own life.1 Unfortunately,
news stories similar to this one have become all too common across
the United States. Not only do public slayings and fatal gun violence
dominate the news headlines and stain our national conscience, but
they also stoke the fire of a debate that rages across our nation’s
political landscape—To what extent should firearms be regulated?
In 2010, there were 12,996 murders in the United States, 8,775
(67.5%) of which were caused by firearms.2 Louisiana alone is
responsible for 437 of those murders, 351 (80%) of which can be
attributed to firearms.3 Based on this astounding data, it is clear that
guns are a dangerous force in our society. However, it is also clear
that guns hold a special place in the history and traditions of our
nation. Indeed, the Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees the right to
keep and bear arms to Americans,4 and since the nation’s founding,
many Americans have come to cherish that right.5 The juxtaposition
of a constitutionally protected right to keep and bear arms with a
daunting violent crime rate has created a uniquely complex political
and legal environment within the United States, which lawmakers
must carefully navigate.
In 2012, the Louisiana Legislature decided to wholly reconstruct
its constitutional provision expressing the right to bear arms.6
Copyright 2013, by K. CONNOR LONG.
1. Kevin Dolak, Newtown Shooting: Residents Shocked by Mass Shooting in
‘Adorable Little Town,’ ABC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US
/newtown-shooting-residents-shocked-mass-killing-adorable-town/story?id=1797
6401.
2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov
/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl11
.xls. 2010 crime rates are the most recent data available.
3. Id. This is the highest percentage of firearm murders of any state in the
country. Louisiana also has the highest murder rate, 7.75 murders per 100,000
people, in the country outside of Washington D.C. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
5. See generally David T. Hardy, Historical Bases of the Right to Bear
Arms, in REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, 45–67 (1982), available at http://www
.guncite.com /journals/senrpt/senhardy.html.
6. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11. The proposed amendment was included on the
ballot of the statewide election held on November 6, 2012. The official ballot read:
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Guided by two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, District of
Columbia v. Heller7 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,8 the
Louisiana Legislature drafted an amendment creating the strongest
right to bear arms provision in the entire country.9 The amendment,
which became effective on December 10, 2012, declares a Louisiana
citizen’s right to bear arms to be fundamental, and any infringement
on this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny judicial review.10
Thus, Louisiana has now become the first state to protect its right to
bear arms using strict scrutiny, which is the most demanding level of
judicial review.11 Because of this exceptionally powerful language,
certain existing Louisiana firearm regulations could very well be
stricken down under the new amendment.12 Yet, this legislative
mandate does not inevitably spell the demise of Louisiana firearm
regulations. According to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, strict
scrutiny review only poses a threat to firearm regulations that are not
narrowly drawn to serve compelling state interests.13 By analyzing
two Louisiana firearm regulations, this Comment argues that in spite
of the legislative bolstering of Louisiana’s right to bear arms, the
state’s existing firearm regulations are safe from judicial rebuff.
Part I of this Comment sets forth the intricacies of the
constitutional amendment and explains the meaning of the new

“Do you support an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Louisiana to
provide that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right and any
restriction of that right requires the highest standard of review by a court?
(Amends Article I, § 11).” Act No. 874, 2012 La. Acts 3525–26. The Senate
approved the amendment by a 31–6 margin on April 6, 2012. The House amended
the bill and voted in favor by a 77–24 margin on May 24, 2012. The Senate
approved the amendments made by the House and passed the measure by a 34–4
margin on May 29, 2012, thereby placing the amendment on the statewide ballot.
SB303 - 2012 Regular Session (Act 874), LOUISIANA ST. LEGISLATURE WEB
PORTAL, http://www.legis.la.gov/legis /BillInfo.aspx?s=12RS&b=SB303&sbi=y
(last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
7. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
8. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
9. Vote Yes on 2: Support the Second Amendment, NRA-ILA INST. FOR
LEGIS. ACTION, http://nraila.org/yeson2 (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
10. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11. See infra Part I.A–B.
11. Marsha Shuler, Gun Rights Amendment Passes Easily, THE ADVOCATE,
Dec. 5, 2012, http://theadvocate .com/home/4351688-125/gun-rights-amendmentpasses-easily. In a 2007 analysis, Professor Adam Winkler found that no state
court had employed strict scrutiny to review gun rights cases. Adam Winkler,
Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2007).
12. Constitutional Amendment 2 Would Put Public Safety at Risk: Leon
Cannizzaro, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 4, 2012, http://www.nola.com/opinions
/index.ssf/2012/11/amendment_2_is_a_risky_idea_fo.html. See infra Part III.A–B.
13. See infra Part I.B.

2013]

COMMENT

291

language set forth in the amendment. This Section focuses
specifically on the significance of the amendment’s classification of
the right to keep and bear arms as “fundamental” and therefore
subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review. Next, Part II examines
the recent course of Second Amendment jurisprudence in the wake
of Heller and McDonald, illustrating that gun regulations have
generally survived judicial scrutiny after Heller and McDonald. Part
III provides a brief survey of Louisiana’s right to bear arms
jurisprudence, and Part IV analyzes the consequences of the
amendment by applying strict scrutiny to two especially controversial
Louisiana firearm regulations: Louisiana Revised Statutes section
40:1379.3 prohibiting concealed handguns on school campuses and
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.1 prohibiting certain felons
from possessing firearms.14 Part IV will demonstrate that by serving
a compelling state interest and being narrowly tailored to that
interest, Louisiana’s gun regulations are capable of withstanding
strict scrutiny judicial review. Although this amendment gives
Louisiana the strongest right to bear arms in the nation, it will not
overturn existing gun regulations nor will it necessarily preclude
other regulations from taking effect.
I. THE AMENDMENT
A Louisiana citizen’s right to keep and bear arms is expressly
enumerated in article I, section 11 of the Constitution of Louisiana.15
Until November 2012, section 11 read: “The right of each citizen to
keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not
prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons
concealed on the person.”16 The Louisiana Legislature, however,
found this current provision to be an inadequate expression of the
right to keep and bear arms and thus passed an amendment to
section 11.17 The Legislature included the amendment on the ballot
of the statewide elections held on November 6, 2012.18 The
14. These particular regulations are analyzed because they stand out as
contested regulations that could likely become the subject of constitutional
challenges in the wake of the amendment. See Alina Mogilyanskaya, Louisiana
Ballot Measure Could Mean More Guns on Campuses, Professor Says, THE
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Nov. 1, 2012, 1:05 PM) http://chronicle
.com/blogs/decision2012/2012/11/01/louisiana-ballot-measure-could-mean-moreguns-on-campuses-professor-says/.
15. LA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
16. LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2012).
17. S. Res. 303, 38th Leg. Sess. (La. 2012).
18. Amendments to the Constitution of 1974, LOUISIANA ST. LEGISLATURE,
http://legis.la.gov/lss/Constitution%20Amendments%20Table.pdf (last visited Sept.
26, 2013).
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amendment passed by an overwhelming majority,19 and as a result,
the new language of article I, section 11 of the Constitution of
Louisiana reads as follows:
§ 11. Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Section 11. The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is
fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction on
this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny.20
The new provision sets forth two major substantive changes to
Louisiana’s constitutional right to keep and bear arms. First, article
I, section 11 now expressly declares the right to keep and bear arms
to be “fundamental,” and second, it mandates that any infringement
upon the right shall hereafter be subject to a strict scrutiny standard
of judicial review.21 The amendment also removed the former
provision that expressly preserved for the Legislature the power to
regulate weapons concealed on the person.22 Each of these new
features combines to form a substantial revision of article I, section
11 of the Constitution of Louisiana, the meaning and effects of
which will be examined in the following Sections.
A. Fundamental Right
The amended section 11 declares the right to keep and bear arms
to be “fundamental.”23 This is a designation that stems from recent
federal jurisprudence interpreting the Second Amendment, which
the Louisiana Legislature has chosen to codify.24 The notion of a
fundamental right has arisen over time from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Bill of Rights.25 In so doing, the
Supreme Court has recognized that some liberties are “so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.”26 Most often, such rights are not expressly
enumerated in the U.S. Constitution; rather, the Court draws them
19. The election results were as follows: 73.45% YES to 26.55% NO. LA.
SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEWIDE ELECTION RESULTS (2012), available at http://static
results.sos.la.gov/11062012/11062012_Statewide.html.
20. LA CONST. art. I, § 11.
21. Id.
22. S. Res. 303, 38th Leg. Sess. (La. 2012).
23. LA CONST. art. I, § 11.
24. However, the Louisiana Legislature went beyond the rulings of Heller and
McDonald by mandating strict scrutiny review. See discussion infra Part II.A–B.
25. Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental
Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101, 105–08 (2002).
26. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See infra Part II.A for
a discussion of the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to bear
arms as a fundamental right.
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out of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.27 Using such methodologies as tradition, social
values, and abstract notions of liberty,28 the Court has identified a
number of fundamental rights, such as the right of privacy,29 the
right to marry,30 and the right of peaceful assembly.31 Because
fundamental rights are considered the most valuable for Americans,
the Supreme Court has reviewed any restriction on a fundamental
right with the highest degree of judicial scrutiny.32 Generally, any
alleged infringement of a fundamental right must satisfy strict
scrutiny in order to pass constitutional muster.33
B. Strict Scrutiny
The notion of heightened scrutiny in judicial review was first
introduced by Justice Stone in the now famous footnote 4 of United
States v. Carolene Products Co.34 Since Justice Stone penned this
footnote in 1938, the Supreme Court has developed three levels of
judicial scrutiny: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny. Rational basis review is the standard most deferential to
legislative action.35 Strict is the most searching, and intermediate
27. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
28. Wolf, supra note 25, at 110.
29. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (holding that a Connecticut law forbidding
the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded on the right of marital
privacy).
30. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
31. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
32. Wolf, supra note 25, at 110.
33. Although largely the accepted practice, this is not a firm rule that the
federal courts must follow. In fact, there are fundamental rights that the Supreme
Court does not subject to strict scrutiny. For instance, the Court has identified the
right to an abortion as a fundamental right, yet it does not uniformly subject an
infringement on this right to a strict scrutiny review. See Planned Parenthood of
S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion) (applying the
“undue burden” test to restrictions on a woman’s fundamental right to abortion).
34. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“It is
unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation.” (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court first used the precise term
“strict scrutiny” in the 1942 case Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 799 (2006).
35. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517 (1980) (Marshall, J.
concurring) (describing rational basis as the “minimally rigorous” standard of
review). Rational basis review demands that a law be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 556 (1934).
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falls somewhere between the two.36 In a constitutional challenge, the
Court typically examines the interest at stake and adjusts the level of
scrutiny according to the constitutional weight of that interest.37
In the past, a strict scrutiny standard of review has been likened
to a death sentence for laws that infringe upon a constitutionally
protected right.38 As the most rigid standard of judicial scrutiny
administered by the Supreme Court, it sets the highest bar for
restrictions on fundamental rights.39 In order to pass strict scrutiny,
not only must the government articulate a compelling interest, the
law must be narrowly tailored to the pursuit of that compelling
interest.40 This searching standard, which has been coined “strict in
theory but fatal in fact,” has led to the rebuke of countless federal
and state laws that infringe on constitutionally protected rights.41
Despite its demanding requirements, a more recent history of the
Court’s application of the strict scrutiny standard has evidenced that
it may not be as “fatal in fact” as it once was.42 The Supreme Court
has recently made an effort to clarify that strict scrutiny, although a
strenuous test, is not meant to be an impossible barrier for
legislation.43 In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court declared that “strict
36. See Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 467 (D. Md. 2012)
(explaining that intermediate scrutiny requires that a law be substantially related to
an important government interest). The Supreme Court has not presented these
three tiers of scrutiny as hard and fast standards that apply uniformly to each
particular case, rather they represent ranges that vary based on the context and
circumstances of a case. See Wolf, supra note 25, at 107.
37. Judicial scrutiny levels have been shaped largely by the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For
instance, the Court subjects race-based distinctions to strict scrutiny. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“We hold today that all
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental
actor, must be analyzed by a review court under strict scrutiny.”). On the other
hand, gender-based distinctions are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
38. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 805–07. Some laws that the Supreme Court
found to further a compelling state interest have nonetheless been stricken down
by the Supreme Court under strict scrutiny. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
432 (1984).
39. Winkler, supra note 34, at 798–804.
40. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“We hold today that all racial
classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”).
41. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978).
42. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 808.
43. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict
scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”).
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scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining
the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decision maker.”44 With this principle in mind, the
Court has more readily considered the broader circumstances and
factual contexts facing legislatures and other government actors
when making policy choices.45 As a result, the use of strict scrutiny
at the Supreme Court level is trending toward a less resolute
standard than that of past decades.46 Although it remains a
formidable opponent for any policy that burdens a fundamental
right, the Supreme Court has expanded the range of strict scrutiny
analysis and clarified that it is not an impossible standard to meet.
II. SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Until very recently, there had been little Supreme Court
jurisprudence interpreting the Second Amendment. In fact, in the 20th
century, the Supreme Court addressed the Second Amendment only
twice, and these decisions did not settle larger looming questions
concerning the right to bear arms.47 Consequently, the lion’s share of
Second Amendment legal interpretation has developed through
doctrinal and scholarly works. In the past, scholarly debate raged over
whether the right to bear arms secured a collective right (a right
reserved for military defense) or an individual right (a right belonging
to the people en masse).48 This debate hinged on the interpretation of
the Amendment’s prefatory clause, which states: “A well regulated
[m]ilitia, being necessary to the security of a free [s]tate . . . .”49
Collectivists assert that the clause narrows the scope of the right to
bear arms to those persons in the military or common defense
44. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003).
45. See id. at 326–27 (explaining that context matters when reviewing racebased governmental action under strict scrutiny); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at
237 (“The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate
reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.”).
46. Winkler, supra note 34, at 808–13. After aggregating 459 cases that
applied strict scrutiny between 1990 and 2003, this study found that a total 137
applications upheld the challenged laws. Id. This amounts to a 30% survival rate
under strict scrutiny—illustrating that strict scrutiny is hardly fatal.
47. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55 (1980). The Supreme Court has addressed the Second Amendment
only five times total in its history. Supreme Court Cases, GUNCITE, http://www
.guncite.com/gc2ndsup.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2010).
48. Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on
the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996). See also U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 2004 WL
2930974 (U.S.A.G. 2004).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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capacity. But individualists maintain that the Framers contemplated
a militia of the whole, and thus every individual person has the right
to bear arms.50
A. District of Columbia v. Heller
The debate between individualists and collectivists came to a
head in the 2008 Supreme Court case, District of Columbia v.
Heller.51 In Heller, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a
handgun and trigger-lock restriction issued by the District of
Columbia.52 D.C. imposed a ban on handguns and mandated that
any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a
trigger lock.53 In its holding, the Court concluded that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms
unconnected with service in a militia and to use that firearm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the
home.54 The outright ban of handguns and the trigger-lock mandate
directly contradicted the right to possess firearms for self-defense,
thus the Court found the laws unconstitutional.55
Heller was the first Supreme Court case to expressly address
whether the Second Amendment entails an individual right to keep
and bear arms as opposed to a collective right reserved for militia
and military purposes.56 In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia
confirmed that the text and history of the Second Amendment’s
operative clause demonstrates that it establishes an individual right
to keep and bear arms.57 He reasoned that the right to bear arms is
intimately tied to the natural right of self-defense.58 Thus, the
Second Amendment is an embodiment of the right that every person
50. Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 2004 WL
2930974 at 1. The consequences of both interpretations have great impacts on the
government’s ability to regulate firearms. Id. at 46. For instance, a collectivist
interpretation allows for heightened regulation of any firearm not used for military
defense. Id. at 2. Because so few citizen-led militias exist today, it is conceivable
that a collective interpretation could pave the way for large-scale firearm
regulation outside of the military. Id. at 2.
51. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 574.
54. Id. at 570.
55. Id.
56. Prior to 2008, the Supreme Court decided only three cases addressing the
Second Amendment, and the Court never determined that it guaranteed an
individual right to keep and bear arms. Amy Hetzner, Where Angels Tread: GunFree School Zone Law and an Individual Right to Bear Arms, 95 MARQ. L. REV.
359, 365 n.30 (2011).
57. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
58. Id. at 599.
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naturally possesses to defend oneself and one’s property against an
aggressor, and any law that obstructs the ability to defend oneself
with a firearm is repugnant to the Second Amendment.59
The Supreme Court did recognize, however, that the right of
self-defense is not absolute, and thus, “[l]ike most rights, the right
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”60 According
to the Court, the right granted by the Second Amendment is not “a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”61 The Court even condoned
certain gun regulations in existence today.62 It expressly laid out a
number of gun regulations that it considered presumptively lawful,
such as restricting the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, as well as laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places like schools and government buildings.63
Most importantly, the Heller opinion effectively reshaped Second
Amendment analysis for future firearm regulation challenges. The
Court not only established an individual right to bear arms for selfdefense, but it acknowledged a scope of behavior to which this right
always applies.64 The Court narrowed the right to bear arms to a
core right: self-defense within the home “where the need for defense
of self, family, and property is most acute.”65 The Court, however,
did not fully develop the scope of the core right; rather it left it to the
lower courts to determine what activities and regulations fall within
this core right.66 Finally, the Heller opinion did not clarify a
standard of review to be implemented in future Second Amendment
cases. The Court ultimately determined that the D.C. handgun ban
amounted to the prohibition of an entire class of arms that
Americans use for the lawful purpose of self-defense,67 and for that
reason, the ban would fail any level of scrutiny.68
59. Id. at 626.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 626–27.
63. Id. at 626–27 n.26. It is not clear whether these regulatory measures are
considered presumptively lawful because they fall outside the scope of the conduct
protected by the Second Amendment or because they survive under the appropriate
standard of scrutiny. Either way, the Court determined that they should be
considered exceptions to the Second Amendment guarantee, and this list is not
exhaustive. Id. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010).
64. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 628–29. Nevertheless, scholars and practitioners have criticized the
Heller opinion for its practical deficiencies. Many think that the Court’s broad
language has opened the door to future Second Amendment challenges, and the
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B. McDonald v. City of Chicago
Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court further developed its
Second Amendment jurisprudence by applying it to the states in
McDonald v. City of Chicago.69 In McDonald, the Court once again
assessed the validity of a handgun ban implemented in Chicago.70
However, unlike Heller, McDonald involved a municipal weapons
ban, thus marking the first Supreme Court ruling on whether the
Second Amendment applies to the states through incorporation.71 In
reaching its determination, the Court first declared that the Second
Amendment sets forth a fundamental right to keep and bear arms.72
Subsequently, a plurality of justices concluded that this right applies
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.73 As a result, a majority concluded that Chicago’s
handgun ban was unconstitutional.74 Further, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the validity of presumptively lawful longstanding
regulatory measures, and as in Heller, the Court declined to
establish a standard of review for Second Amendment cases.75
Through Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the legal significance of the Second Amendment. The Court in
Heller finally resolved the debate between collectivists and
individualists, stating conclusively that every American has the right
to keep and bear arms for self-defense.76 Moreover, a plurality in
McDonald agreed that the Second Amendment does, in fact, apply
to the states through incorporation,77 and despite any doubts
remaining after Heller, the McDonald Court clarified that the right
to bear arms is indeed a fundamental right.78 However, in neither
case did the Supreme Court firmly assert which level of scrutiny

opinion will create confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts. See J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L.
REV. 253, 280 (2009).
69. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
70. Id. at 3021.
71. Id. at 3031.
72. Id. at 3042.
73. Id. at 3050. Justice Thomas concurred arguing that incorporation should
occur through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than the Due Process Clause. Id. at 3059–87 (Thomas, J. concurring).
74. Id. at 3021.
75. Id. at 3042.
76. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
77. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031.
78. Id. at 3042.
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must be applied to future Second Amendment challenges.79 Instead,
it left this question for the lower courts to decide.
C. Second Amendment Challenges in Federal Courts After Heller
and McDonald
In the wake of Heller and McDonald, a number of challenges to
federal gun regulations, particularly laws prohibiting firearm
possession in sensitive places and by convicted felons, have
emerged.80 Claimants have asserted that such firearm regulations
unconstitutionally infringe upon their fundamental, individual right to
bear arms.81 However, after Heller and McDonald, certain firearm
regulations appear to be safe from constitutional invalidation.82 In
Heller, the majority opinion stated:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.83
This statement not only recognizes certain common firearm
regulations, but it also provides constitutional protection for any
such longstanding firearm regulations.84
Despite this express Supreme Court safeguard, federal circuit
courts have faced a number of constitutional challenges to various
elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922, the comprehensive federal gun
regulation statute.85 In addressing these challenges, circuit courts
have developed certain trends in their interpretations of Heller and
79. Id.; Heller, 544 U.S. at 628.
80. Scholars predicted correctly that the broad language in Heller and
McDonald would open the doors to extensive Second Amendment challenges in
the lower courts. See Wilkinson, supra note 68, at 283 (explaining some of the
questions that remain after the narrow holding of Heller).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
82. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
83. Id. See also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047. The majority in McDonald reemphasized this point made in Heller. Id. It stated: “We made it clear in Heller
that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures . . . .
We repeat those assurances here.” Id.
84. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009) (using the
longstanding prohibition dicta from Heller to uphold the constitutionality of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(7), prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, despite Heller’s
holding that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to possess
firearms); see also United States v. Gieswein, 346 F. App’x. 293 (10th Cir. 2009).
85. See infra note 99.
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McDonald.86 Most notably, circuit courts have expounded upon
Heller’s dicta declaring the Second Amendment to be a limited
right.87 In other words, despite being fundamental, the right to bear
arms is subject to legislative regulation. Under this premise, lower
federal courts have consistently upheld existing firearm regulations
after Heller and McDonald.88
Federal circuit courts have predominately relied on two
analytical frameworks in assessing the constitutionality of firearm
regulations: (1) Heller’s list of presumptively lawful regulations and
(2) the traditional ends–means scrutiny examination.89 In cases
involving regulations found on Heller’s presumptively lawful list of
prohibitions,90 many courts have simply pointed to the list as a
source of regulations categorically excluded from Second
Amendment protection and upheld the application of the law in that
case.91 In such cases, the courts determined that because of their
exclusion from Second Amendment protection, such regulations did
not warrant any ends–means analysis.92 The Eleventh Circuit has
even included by analogy certain regulations that do not appear in
Heller’s list, such as violent misdemeanor crimes.93
Other courts have analyzed challenges to firearm regulations
under the traditional ends–means analysis, instead of relying on

86. See infra note 88.
87. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both
text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep
and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited . . . .”). See, e.g., United
States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 22–24 (1st Cir. 2011) (reaffirming this Heller
dicta).
88. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits possession of firearms by
individuals convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence); Booker, 644
F.3d at 26; United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding
a prohibition of firearm possession by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
89. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1313–16
(M.D. Ga. 2011), aff’d, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) (discussing the various
analytical methods employed by the federal circuit courts).
90. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010).
91. See Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 (upholding a prohibition of firearm
possession by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d
1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding the same prohibition against felon
possession, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th
Cir. 2009).
92. Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771.
93. United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), prohibiting the possession of a firearm by anyone convicted
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, deserved a place on the “list of
longstanding prohibitions on which Heller does not cast doubt”).
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Heller’s list.94 These courts have examined the regulation at issue in
order to uncover a sufficient showing to justify the restriction on the
right to bear arms.95 Finally, some courts have analyzed guns laws
under both frameworks: analogizing to Heller’s presumptively
lawful regulations as well as subjecting it to an ends–means scrutiny
examination.96
Federal courts have also varied the level of scrutiny in Second
Amendment cases after Heller. The Court in Heller specifically
rejected rational basis scrutiny for laws burdening the Second
Amendment, but it declined to explicitly endorse either intermediate
or strict scrutiny.97 In light of the Supreme Court’s ambiguity,
circuit courts have likewise declined to acknowledge a universal
standard of scrutiny for Second Amendment cases; instead, they
have reasoned that the level of scrutiny applied will depend on the
extent to which the right is burdened.98 Under this reasoning, the
majority of federal circuits have found intermediate scrutiny, which
examines whether there is a reasonable fit between the law and an
important government interest, to be the most appropriate standard
to apply.99 However, several circuits have recognized that certain
94. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying
an ends–means analysis to a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits
the possession of a firearm by anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence); see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir.
2010).
95. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641–42.
96. See United States v. Walker, 709 F. Supp. 2d. 460, 464 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(“[D]ue to the . . . uncertainty over the proper analysis in other Circuits, this Court
will apply both approaches.”).
97. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (“If all that
was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the
Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional
prohibitions of irrational laws, and would have no effect.”). The Court also noted
that the handgun ban in question was so burdensome that it failed constitutional
muster under any level of scrutiny. Id. at 628–29 (“Under any of the standards of
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights [the ban] . . .
would fail constitutional muster.”).
98. See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164–68 (2d Cir. 2012)
(holding that a law regulating the availability of firearms is not a substantial
burden on the right to keep and bear arms and therefore heightened scrutiny is not
appropriate). “[H]eightened scrutiny is appropriate only as to those regulations that
substantially burden the Second Amendment.” Id. at 164.
99. See United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010)
(determining that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits possession of firearms by
anyone who is subject to a domestic protection order, shall be subject to
intermediate scrutiny); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96 (suggesting that because the
Heller Court explicitly rejected rational basis scrutiny for Second Amendment
restrictions, yet struck down the handgun ban, implies that it applied some form of
heightened scrutiny); Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641 (concluding that 18 U.S.C. §
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restrictions on the Second Amendment may warrant a higher level
of scrutiny.100 They agree that certain regulations may be so
burdensome on the right to bear arms that they warrant strict
scrutiny, and a small number of courts have even gone so far as to
apply strict scrutiny.101 Ultimately, regardless of the level of scrutiny
applied, federal courts have consistently upheld gun regulations that
burden the Second Amendment right to bear arms in the wake of
Heller and McDonald.102

922(g)(9), prohibiting any person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence from possessing a firearm, was subject to intermediate scrutiny); see also
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010).
100. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96–97 (“[T]he right to free speech, an
undeniably enumerated fundamental right, . . . is susceptible to several standards
of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law challenged and the type of speech at
issue. We see no reason why the Second Amendment would be any different.”);
United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The Second
Amendment is no more susceptible to a one-size-fits-all standard of review than
any other constitutional right.”).
101. See Reese, 627 F.3d at 804 n.4 (stating that, although it declared
intermediate scrutiny the appropriate level of review, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) could
also pass strict scrutiny); United States v. Ligon, No. 3:04-cr-00185 HDM, 2010
WL 4237970, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 20, 2010) (applying strict scrutiny and
upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018,
1021–25 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits
firearm possession by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence, primarily by analogy to Heller’s presumptively lawful regulations, but
also concluding that it would survive strict scrutiny as well); see also United States
v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d. 779, 789–91 (E.D. Va. 2009) (applying strict
scrutiny and upholding 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2007), which prohibited the possession
of a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in a National Park), aff’d, 638 F.3d 458 (4th
Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Engstrum, 609 F.
Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–35 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny and upholding 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556 (LEK), 2008 WL
4534058 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008); Bateman v. Perdue, 881 F. Supp. 2d 709
(E.D.N.C. 2012); United States v. Bay, No. 2:09-CR-83 TS, 2009 WL 3818382
(D. Utah Nov. 13, 2009); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir.
2001) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), prohibiting felons from possession of
firearms). “Although, as we have held, the Second Amendment does protect
individual rights, that does not mean that those rights may never be made subject
to any limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
102. United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that no Second Amendment challenge to any provision of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g), a part of the amended Gun Control Act of 1968 that forbids gun
possession by nine classes of individuals, has succeeded). See also supra note 88.
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D. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach
The most consistent Second Amendment analysis to develop
since Heller has emerged from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. Over a series of Second Amendment
challenges, the Fourth Circuit has established a unique criterion to
determine the gravity of a particular challenge.103 The Fourth Circuit
has focused its Second Amendment analysis on the core right first
established in Heller—a law-abiding citizen’s right to keep and
bear arms for defense of hearth and home.104 If a particular exercise
of the Second Amendment falls completely within the scope of this
core right, the court will apply a strict scrutiny standard of review to
ensure that the core right is afforded the highest protection.105
However, if the regulated behavior does not fall firmly within the
scope of this core right, then the court will apply a less demanding
scrutiny.106 In other words, if the firearm regulation in question does
not involve the restriction of an individual’s use of a firearm for selfdefense within his home, then the court will not subject it to a strict
scrutiny review.107
The Fourth Circuit applied this reasoning in United States v.
Chester,108 a case in which the appellant challenged 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9),109 which prohibits the possession of a firearm by any
person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as
an infringement of his protected right to bear arms.110 This asapplied Second Amendment challenge compelled the court to decide
the appropriate amount of Second Amendment protection afforded
to the defendant under this particular statute.111 The court first
identified the Heller core right as “the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”112
Then the court determined that the appellant’s prior conviction of
misdemeanor domestic violence placed him outside the scope of this
103. See Chester, 628 F.3d 673; Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458.
104. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). See also
Chester, 628 F.3d at 676.
105. Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 467 (D. Md. 2012).
106. Id. at 468–70.
107. Id.
108. 628 F.3d 673.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“It shall be unlawful for any person—who has
been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship
or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . .”).
110. Chester, 628 F.3d 673.
111. Id. at 678.
112. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
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core right.113 Because of his criminal history, the appellant, Chester,
could not be classified as a law-abiding citizen; therefore, the court
concluded that this case did not warrant the Second Amendment’s
highest protection.114
The Fourth Circuit further refined its Second Amendment
analysis in United States v. Masciandaro. Here, the appellant
challenged a statute that prohibited loaded guns in a National
Park.115 Unlike Chester, Masciandaro had no criminal history, thus
he fell within the scope of a law-abiding citizen.116 However, the
court distinguished Masciandaro’s access to the core right on other
grounds. The court tightened the scope of the right by restricting it
to the use of firearms within the home.117 In this case, Masciandaro
was convicted of possessing a gun not in his home but in a public
park.118 Accordingly, the court concluded that because the statute
pertained to the possession of a firearm outside of the home, it did
not burden the core Second Amendment right, and therefore, a lesser
scrutiny review was appropriate.119
Based on these two cases, the Fourth Circuit has effectively
adopted the same core Second Amendment right as posited by the
majority in Heller: the right of a law-abiding citizen to keep and
bear arms within the home for the purpose of self-defense.120 Any
circumstance that does not include these elements falls outside of
the scope of the core right and thus will not receive the Second
Amendment’s strongest protection.121 In applying the core right
analysis to a gun regulation challenge, a court must consider the
circumstances of the defendant in relation to his position within the
113. Chester, 628 F.3d at 683.
114. Id.
115. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 2011); 36
C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2007).
116. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470.
117. Id. at 471. Also in Heller, the Court stated that the home is “where the
need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.” 554 U.S. at 628.
118. See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470. The court discussed the fact that when
a firearm leaves the privacy of a home, it becomes a more significant issue of
public security. Id. The state has a greater interest in regulating guns outside of the
home, especially those in a national park open to the general public. Id. See also
Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (noting that this reasoning is reflected by the majority of
courts in the 19th century ruling it lawful to regulate the possession of concealed
handguns under the Second Amendment).
119. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471.
120. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 673 (4th Cir. 2010);
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 460.
121. See United States v. Smoot, 690 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying
the core right analysis to a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), prohibiting felons from possessing firearms); see also United States v.
Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 319–20 (4th Cir. 2012).

2013]

COMMENT

305

scope of the right.122 The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning would dictate
that a statute prohibiting behavior that falls outside of a law-abiding
citizen’s use of a firearm for self-defense within the home will be
better positioned to pass a strict scrutiny examination.123
Accordingly, statutes such as felony-firearm restrictions and schoolzone restrictions will be more likely to meet strict scrutiny because
they do not burden the core right—They extend to firearm use
beyond the home and to individuals outside of the law-abiding
class.124 If this is the case, similar firearm regulations may have a
strong chance of survival, even under strict scrutiny.
III. LOUISIANA’S RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS JURISPRUDENCE
Louisiana’s gun rights case law has developed out of important
cases dating back to the 19th century. In the past, the Supreme Court
of Louisiana has recognized the right to keep and bear arms;
however, traditionally, it has ruled with considerable deference to
the Legislature regarding gun regulations.125 Louisiana courts have
previously addressed past firearm legislation, such as concealedcarry and felony-firearm restrictions, that are akin to modern
regulations that remain the focus of the contemporary gun law
debate.126 In doing so, they have laid an important methodological
foundation for future challenges to Louisiana firearm regulations.
A. Concealed-Carry Regulations
The Supreme Court of Louisiana first addressed a citizen’s right
to bear arms in a line of cases beginning with State v. Chandler in
1850.127 In Chandler, the court faced a challenge against a law that

122. See Chester, 628 F.3d 673; Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458. In other words,
the defendant must be a law-abiding citizen using a firearm within his home for
the purpose of self-defense.
123. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471. In other words, the court may recognize
that a statute regulating behavior outside of the core right is more narrowly
tailored than a law that regulates behavior resting firmly within the scope of the
core right. Because such a regulation is narrowly tailored, it will have a better
chance of passing strict scrutiny.
124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:95.1, .2 (2009). These statutes fall outside of
the scope of the core right to bear arms because they regulate behavior outside of a
private home and pertain to people with criminal histories. They do not regulate
law-abiding citizens using firearms within the home for self-defense.
125. Louisiana courts have consistently applied rational basis review to gunregulation challenges. See infra note 151.
126. See infra Parts III.A–B.
127. State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (La. 1850).
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criminalized the carrying of a concealed weapon.128 The court found
that such a regulation did not offend the Second Amendment’s
guarantee to the right to bear arms.129 The court reasoned that this
law did not interfere with a citizen’s right to carry arms in open
view, which is the central right guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States.130 Indeed, the court acknowledged that the right to
bear arms was attached to the right to defend oneself, thus implicitly
recognizing the individual nature of the right.131
The Supreme Court of Louisiana again addressed a law against
carrying concealed weapons in State v. Smith.132 As in Chandler two
years before, the court concluded that the concealed-weapons
regulation was constitutional.133 In this decision, the court made the
notable declaration that the Second Amendment “never intended to
prevent the individual States from adopting such measures of police
as might be necessary.”134 The court concluded that this law was, in
fact, necessary to protect the citizens from the dangerous use of
weapons.135 Because the law met this necessary purpose
requirement, the court professed that there is “nothing in the
Constitution of the United States which requires of us a rigorous
construction of the statute in question.”136
The most notable concealed-carry case in Louisiana dates back
to 1858. The Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. Jumel assessed
the lawfulness of prohibiting the possession of concealed
weapons.137 In its brief analysis, the court concluded: “The statute in
question does not infringe the right of the people to keep or bear
arms which is found dangerous to the peace of society.”138 Although
the court did not consciously engage in an ends–means scrutiny
analysis,139 one can easily draw a contemporary, syllogistic formula
128. Id.
129. Id. The right to bear arms was not explicitly recognized in Louisiana until
the Constitution of 1879; consequently, this case was a challenge based on the
Second Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633 (La. 1856).
133. Id. at 633.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 634. The court makes a point to expressly dismiss the need for a
higher standard of review for this statute. Id. Because it meets the requirement of
being a necessary policing measure, it need not undergo further scrutiny. Id.
137. State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399, 399 (La. 1858).
138. Id. at 399–400.
139. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
The principle of heightened judicial scrutiny did not emerge until the mid-20th
century. It dates back to footnote 4 of Carolene. Id. See discussion supra Part I.B.

2013]

COMMENT

307

out of this opinion. The court first recognized a right to keep and
bear arms,140 then identified the state interest of maintaining peace
in society, and finally determined that this restriction was particular,
or narrow, enough to further this state objective.141
Jumel stemmed from a different era of legal history and
evolution, yet its reasoning remains helpful. A Louisiana state court
today must engage in a contemporary form of judicial review, but a
mere change in verbiage does not necessarily denote a change in
fundamental analysis.142 When examining the constitutionality of
Louisiana’s current concealed handgun permit statute,143 the court
must apply a similar mechanical analysis as that employed by the
court in Jumel, only now, because of the amendment’s strict scrutiny
mandate, a more rigorous inquiry is required.
B. Firearm Restrictions for Convicted Felons
The state courts of Louisiana have, in the past, faced a number
of challenges to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.1, which
prohibits certain felons from possessing firearms,144 as an
unconstitutional infringement of the right to keep and bear arms
guaranteed by the Constitution of Louisiana.145 In State v. Amos, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled on the constitutionality of
prohibiting firearms from convicted felons.146 In its decision, the
court set forth a number of significant points. First, the court
recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is a guaranteed right,
but it is not absolute.147 The court then acknowledged that the right
may be regulated in order to protect the public health, safety, and
morals or general welfare, so long as the regulation is a reasonable
one.148 Using this reasonableness test, the court concluded that
denying weapons from serious felons is a reasonable measure to
take in the interest of public welfare and safety, and therefore
140. See State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (La. 1850). At the time, the
Louisiana Constitution did not include an express right to keep and bear arms
provision. David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review
for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1136
(2010).
141. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. at 399–400.
142. See Kopel & Cramer, supra note 140, at 1113.
143. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1379.3 (2010).
144. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2009). See infra Part IV.C.
145. See, e.g., State v. Cobb, 428 So. 2d 935 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
146. State v. Amos, 343 So. 2d 166 (La. 1977).
147. Id. at 168. This point is consistent with the same point made in Heller
some 40 years after this case. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
682–83 (2008).
148. Amos, 343 So. 2d at 168.
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section 14:95.1 did not impermissibly infringe upon the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of Louisiana.149
C. Louisiana’s Contemporary Approach to Reviewing Firearm
Regulations
These past cases illustrate that, over the course of its history, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana has consistently recognized the
principle that the right to bear arms is not an absolute right. The
Supreme Court has continued to extend this reasoning to cases in
more recent history. In particular, the court in State v. Blanchard
applied a rational basis standard of review to a statute that
criminalized the possession of a firearm while in possession of a
controlled dangerous substance.150 The court held “that there is a
rational relationship between the statute’s scope . . . and its
legitimate state purpose of preventing drug-related violence.”151
Blanchard illustrates that leading up to the passage of the section
11 amendment, the Supreme Court of Louisiana was committed to
rational basis scrutiny, the least demanding standard of review, for
gun regulation challenges.152 The Blanchard opinion reflects an
analysis consistently employed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana
in preceding cases addressing Second Amendment challenges.153
Accordingly, proponents of the amendment’s strict scrutiny mandate
are concerned that the court’s commitment to rational basis review
has left the existing right to bear arms vulnerable to further
legislative and judicial exploitation.154 By applying rational basis
review, the judiciary has essentially put the integrity of the right to
bear arms exclusively in the hands of the Legislature.155 However,
149. Id.; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Note the current version of section 11 is the
same as it was in 1974.
150. State v. Blanchard, 776 So. 2d 1165, 1173 (La. 2001).
151. Id. The court was applying a rational basis test to an equal protection
analysis. Id. Although the rights at issue may be different, the analysis is
fundamentally the same. The court must find a means that is rationally related to
the state’s end. This is the exact language employed by the court in this opinion.
Id.
152. See supra note 35.
153. See State v. Clement, 368 So. 2d 1037 (La. 1979); State v. Hamlin, 497
So. 2d 1369 (La. 1986) (holding that it is reasonable for the Legislature, in the
interest of public safety and welfare, to require the registration of a sawed-off
shotgun whose customary use is in the perpetuation of crime).
154. See Video: Judiciary C Hearing on S.B. 303 (La. 38th Regular Session
2012) (on file with Louisiana State Senate, Broadcast Archives) where Senator
Neil Riser expresses his concern that the existing gun laws are vulnerable to
judicial challenge.
155. Generally, rational basis is characterized as a very limited review. See
United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2009). It affords nearly
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such judicial deference will no longer be possible as a result of this
amendment. The judiciary is now bound to apply strict scrutiny to
any law that burdens the right to bear arms, and this much more
thorough judicial examination will demand the utmost justification
for any legislation in question.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT: THE IMPACT OF THE AMENDMENT
ON CURRENT FIREARM REGULATIONS
The new section 11 of the Constitution of Louisiana reads: “The
right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall
not be infringed. Any restriction on this right shall be subject to
strict scrutiny.”156 Although proponents of the amendment assert
that their goal is to secure a lasting right to bear arms in Louisiana
by codifying the holdings of Heller and McDonald, the amendment
extends beyond these two decisions.157 The U.S. Supreme Court in
both Heller and McDonald denied the opportunity to mandate strict
scrutiny review for firearm regulations.158 Instead, the Court left the
level of review open to the discretion of the lower courts.159
Nevertheless, the Louisiana Legislature has gone a step further than
the Supreme Court by mandating strict scrutiny for any infringement
of Louisiana’s fundamental right to keep and bear arms.160 Such a
substantial revision of section 11 of the Constitution of Louisiana
undoubtedly signifies an intention to break from existing state
jurisprudence and spawn a new line of judicial interpretation for
Louisiana’s right to bear arms.161 Because challenges to gun laws
are sure to arise in the wake of this amendment, it is imperative to
understand how strict scrutiny will affect Louisiana’s firearm
regulations.
A. Breadth of the Amendment
In order to fully comprehend the consequences of a strict
scrutiny standard of review for Louisiana’s gun regulations, the

complete deference to the legislative process. Id. If the legislature sees fit to pass a
law to address a particular concern, the court will not interfere. Id.
156. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
157. Video: Judiciary C Hearing on S.B. 303, supra note 154.
158. See supra Part II.A, B.
159. See supra Part II.A. Also note, in his opinion Scalia stated that a rational
basis review for a Second Amendment infringement would not be appropriate.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
160. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
161. Video: Judiciary C Hearing on S.B. 303, supra note 154.
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language and scope of the statutes must be carefully dissected.
Because there have been no Louisiana state court cases addressing a
Second Amendment challenge post-Heller and McDonald, it is
necessary to consider how other state courts and federal circuit
courts have handled such challenges. Although existing Louisiana
jurisprudence concerning the right to bear arms remains binding on
its own courts, it is now, alone, insufficient. Louisiana courts have
consistently applied the equivalent of rational basis review to
firearm regulation challenges, but in the face of the amendment’s
strict scrutiny mandate, courts must now develop a new approach to
analyzing restrictions on the right to bear arms.162
As a result of the amendment, any new or existing Louisiana
firearm regulation, each of which impacts the fundamental right to
bear arms, is now susceptible to challenge under the new section
11.163 Accordingly, it is crucial for any gun regulation’s survival that
it not only serve a compelling state interest but that it is narrowly
tailored so as to be absolutely necessary to serve that state
objective.164 Despite valid concerns, many of Louisiana’s existing
gun laws are, indeed, capable of passing strict scrutiny. As exhibited
by the firearm regulations discussed in the Subsections below,
Louisiana gun laws do serve compelling state interests and are
narrowly tailored to those interests.
B. Concealed Handguns
There are currently 83 laws regulating firearms in Louisiana.165
These laws regulate various facets of buying, selling, and using
guns. Many such regulations are known as time, place, and manner
restrictions.166 These laws govern a person’s ability to carry and use
a firearm, and they are often some of the most restrictive regulatory
measures.167 Because these regulations present significant burdens
on the right to keep and bear arms, they are often the measures that
fall under constitutional attack.168 Louisiana has a number of laws

162. See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; supra Part III.C.
163. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
164. See supra Part I.B.
165. Video: Judiciary C Hearing on S.B. 303, supra note 154.
166. See Michael Anthony Lawrence, Government As Liberty’s Servant: The
“Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner” Standard of Review for All Government
Restrictions on Liberty Interests, 68 LA. L. REV. 1, 49 (2007).
167. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 (2010).
168. Nicholas Johnson, Associated Press, Gun-rights Backers Expect Suits
Against NY Gun Law, FORDHAM U. (Jan. 16, 2013), http://law.fordham
.edu/28746.htm.
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that restrict guns in certain locations and from certain people.169
Because every Louisiana citizen now has the fundamental right to
own and carry a firearm, any such restriction must be able to
withstand strict scrutiny.170
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1379.3 stipulates that
anyone who qualifies for a permit under the provisions of the statute
is eligible to carry a concealed handgun on his person in any parish
in Louisiana for a period of five years.171 This statute restricts a
person’s ability to carry a firearm, consequently it infringes a
Louisiana citizen’s fundamental right to bear arms and must be
subject to strict scrutiny.
Under this statute, an applicant must meet 19 minimum
requirements in order to qualify under the statute.172 The applicant
must be at least 21 years old and must undergo training in pistol
handling.173 Also, the statute precludes those with mental infirmity
due to disease, illness, or retardation, as well as those convicted of a
felony or a crime of violence, from qualifying under the statute.174
In addition to these threshold requirements, an applicant must
“demonstrate competence with a handgun.”175 A person who
completes any National Rifle Association (NRA) handgun safety or
training course conducted by an NRA-certified instructor is deemed
competent with a handgun.176 The completion of any training course
offered by a law enforcement agency will also suffice as proof of
handgun competency.177
This statute’s most problematic provision is set forth in the
second subsection of the statute, which states: “A Louisiana resident
shall be required to possess a valid concealed handgun permit issued
by the state of Louisiana pursuant to the provisions of this section in
order to carry a concealed handgun in the state of Louisiana.”178 In
other words, the carrying of a concealed handgun is unlawful unless
the carrier has a valid permit issued in accordance with this statute.
Beyond this basic restriction, the statute includes two more
169. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:95.1, .2 (2009).
170. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
171. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 (2010). In 2010, the Legislature
amended this statute to extend the lifetime of the permit from four to five years.
H.B. 1272, Act no. 944.
172. Nicole Montagnet Smith, Packing Heat in Louisiana: An Analysis of
Louisiana’s New Concealed Handgun Legislation and Its Possible Constitutional
Ramifications, 43 LOY. L. REV. 239, 241 (1997).
173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(C)(1), (4) (2009).
174. Id. § 40:1379.3(C)(5), (6), (9).
175. Id. § 40:1379.3(D)(1).
176. Id. § 40:1379.3(D)(1)(a); Smith, supra note 172, at 241.
177. § 40:1379.3(D)(1)(b) (listing other additional methods of training).
178. Id. § 40:1379.3(B)(2).
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prohibitions that burden a Louisiana citizen’s right to bear arms.
First, it prohibits qualified permit holders from carrying a concealed
handgun while under the influence of alcohol or drugs,179 and
second, a qualified permit holder cannot carry a concealed handgun
“in any facility, building, location, zone, or area in which firearms
are banned by state or federal law,”180 or in any “school, school
campus, or school bus.”181 Consequently, this statute imposes three
restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms for Louisiana citizens.
Generally, it restricts the freedom to freely carry a concealed
handgun on one’s person;182 and for those persons who hold a
concealed handgun permit pursuant to this statute, it restricts the
possession of a handgun when using alcohol or drugs and the
possession of a handgun within certain unauthorized locations.183
This statute can be dissected into three distinct restrictions on the
right to bear arms, but most likely a claimant will mount an attack
against the statute’s more constitutionally vulnerable prohibitions,184
such as the prohibition against carrying concealed handguns in
sensitive places.185 “Place restrictions” on firearms are blanket
prohibitions that constitute a direct infringement on the express
fundamental right to bear arms.186 Because these prohibitions
burden the right to bear arms so heavily, it is more difficult to justify
their necessity under strict scrutiny.
1. Concealed Handguns in Schools
One likely battleground to emerge from within Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 40:1379.3 will be the prohibition of
179. Id. § 40:1379.3(I)(1).
180. Id. § 40:1379.3(M).
181. Id. § 40:1379.3(N)(11). This was amended in 2010 to remove “firearm
free zone,” which includes any area within 1,000 feet of a school campus. 2010
La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 925 (H.B. 556) (West). Accordingly, a concealed
handgun permit holder in Louisiana can now carry a concealed handgun on any
public property within 1,000 feet of a school campus. Id.
182. One should note that this has no bearing on Louisiana’s open carry law.
See, e.g., State v. Ferrand, 664 So. 2d 396, 397 (La. 1995) (“[T]he public
possession of an openly displayed handgun is not a crime in Louisiana and does
not alone provide probable cause for an arrest.”).
183. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 (2009).
184. For instance, a court will likely have little trouble surmising the legality of
a prohibition against drunk people carrying concealed handguns as set forth
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1379.3(I)(1). Such a prohibition clearly
serves a compelling state interest in public safety and is tailored to include only
those inhibited by alcohol.
185. § 40:1379.3(M).
186. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
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handguns on school campuses.187 In light of the recent Newtown,
Connecticut, tragedy, guns on school campuses have become the
central issue of a heated, nationwide debate.188 Louisiana, like many
other states, restricts the presence of firearms, including concealed
handguns, on school campuses.189 With limited exceptions, no
person is permitted to carry a weapon, concealed or not, on school
property.190 Although this law constitutes a direct infringement of
the fundamental right to keep and bear arms,191 it remains a
permissible infringement because it is narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.192
a. Compelling State Interest
The first prong of strict scrutiny analysis requires the existence
of a compelling state interest. In State v. Jumel, the court recognized
that banning concealed weapons fulfilled the state’s goal of
achieving social peace.193 In this same vein, Louisiana continues to
have a right, if not a duty, to ensure peace and safety for its
citizens.194 This public safety interest also extends to, and may even
be heightened on, school campuses where large groups of young
people gather to pursue educational and social activities.195
Generally speaking, the regulation of concealed handguns is an
attempt to promote safety and thwart violence in society. A handgun
concealed on a person poses a threat to innocent bystanders, as well
as to law enforcement officers as they attempt to create a secure
environment in public places.196 It is in the best interest of the state
187. § 40:1379.3(N)(11).
188. Guns and Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top
/reference/timestopics/subjects/g/gun_control/index.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2013). See generally Gunfight in America, USATODAY.COM, http://www
.usatoday.com/topic/9694898b-d569-45b7-82b8-f3c6f5192868/gunfight-in-america
(last visited Jan 21, 2013) (compiling several updated news sources relating to the
current gun regulation debate).
189. § 40:1379.3(N)(11); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2(A) (2009).
190. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2 (2009).
191. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
192. See supra Part I.B.
193. State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399, 399 (La. 1858).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (recognizing
public safety to be a compelling state interest); see also Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (stating that due process rights are limited by the states’ powers
to protect the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public).
195. See United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d. 779, 790 (E.D. Va.
2009).
196. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2010)
(discussing studies finding that an assault with a gun is five times more deadly
than an assault with a knife).
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to impose regulations to ensure that those permitted to carry
concealed weapons are well-trained and safe individuals. This lends
itself to a secondary purpose of the statute: to allow qualified
citizens the ability to legally defend themselves with a handgun.197
Accordingly, this statute aims to facilitate public safety and prevent
violence by providing state regulation and oversight of guns while
still allowing those qualified to exercise their fundamental right to
bear arms for self-defense.
In addition to the state’s interest in general public safety, schools
are especially sensitive places in need of heightened regulation.198
The state has a vested interest in ensuring the best education
possible for its citizens. An element of this goal includes the
responsibility to provide a safe and healthy environment in which
students can effectively interact and learn.199 Also, schools are
public places where large amounts of people, often strangers, gather
together.200 Whenever large groups of people congregate in a public
place, a unique security interest arises.201 Applying this sensible
reasoning, a Louisiana court will likely agree that protecting
students and other members of the public on school campuses
amounts to a compelling state interest.
b. Narrowly Tailored Means
The second prong of strict scrutiny examines the sufficiency of
the means used to achieve the compelling state interest.202 Under
this heightened review, section 40:1379.3 must be narrowly tailored
197. Smith, supra note 172, at 239 (describing Governor Foster’s express
purpose behind the concealed handgun permit statute).
198. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(N)(11) (2009).
199. The Case Against Guns on Campus, THE CAMPAIGN TO KEEP GUNS OFF
CAMPUS, http://www.keepgunsoffcampus.org/brady.html (last visited Dec. 13,
2012).
200. See Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 790 (making sense of the Heller
sensitive places reference, the court made a distinction between a public place and
a private home).
201. See id. at 789–90. Applying strict scrutiny to a statute prohibiting loaded
firearms in national parks, the federal district court determined that the
governmental interest of public safety in national parks is important and
compelling. Id. It reasoned that, like schools and government buildings, National
Parks are public properties attracting large numbers of people for recreational and
educational activities. Id. Unlike a home or other private property where the
“‘need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,’” national parks,
schools, and government buildings are sensitive places where the necessity and
means of firearm regulation must be left up to the legislature to decide, not the
judiciary. Id. at 790 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628
(2008)).
202. Winkler, supra note 34, at 727.
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to the state’s interest of promoting safety on school campuses.
Often, this part of the review presents the largest problems for
legislation.203 Generally, the statute in question must effectively
address the state’s concern or objective without being under- or
over-inclusive.204 Also, the state must not have any less restrictive
alternatives to achieve its goal.205 In other words, the regulation
must not impose any burden on the fundamental right to keep and
bear arms that is not necessary for the furtherance of protecting
school campuses from violence.
Although section 40:1379.3 falls outside the scope of the core
right because it restricts behavior outside of the home, it nonetheless
infringes on a Louisiana citizen’s fundamental right to keep and bear
arms.206 While most school administrators and gun control activists
vehemently oppose guns on school campuses, others question the
effectiveness of such a regulation in preventing violence.207 Many
gun lobbyists argue that an environment with the lawful presence of
guns is inherently safer.208 These activists often cite statistics
illustrating that gun bans do not translate into a reduction in crime
rates.209 It follows that if a law is inherently ineffective, it will
unlikely be considered narrowly tailored; however, this data remains
inconclusive, and it will ultimately fall upon the court to decide its
relevance.210
i. A Potential Weakness
One aspect of this regulation has fallen under particular
criticism: Section 40:1379.3, when read in pari materia with section
14:95.2 prohibiting the possession of firearms on school property,
203. Id. at 800.
204. Id. at 801 n.31.
205. See Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 467 (D. Md. 2012).
206. See supra Part I.A; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (establishing the
natural right of self defense).
207. John R. Lott, More Guns Equal Less Violent Crime, L.A.R.G.O.,
http://www.largo.org/Lott.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
208. See generally JOHN R. LOTT, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (2d ed. 2000).
209. Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago:
Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 437, 457 (2011).
210. For instance, several published criticisms have undermined the findings
set forth in Lott’s, More Guns, Less Crime, supra note 208, by criticizing the
quality of his evidence or by demonstrating conflicting evidence using a similar
methodology. See also Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms, Violence, and the Potential
Impact of Firearms Control, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 34 (2004) (collecting studies
and asserting that guns are about five times more deadly than knives in a violent
attack).
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creates an inconsistency in the law.211 Section 14:95.2 declares that
its provisions shall not apply to a “student who possesses a firearm
in his dormitory room or a student who is carrying a firearm to and
from his vehicle.”212 Meanwhile, such activity is banned by section
40:1379.3 for qualified permit holders.213 In other words, a student
without a concealed handgun permit can lawfully possess a firearm
in his dorm room and can carry the firearm to and from his car on
campus, but a professor or school employee who holds a concealed
handgun permit shares no equivalent right.214 The concern here lies
in the school employee’s inability to exercise his right to defend
himself while at work and while walking to and from his vehicle.
Conceivably a nighttime walk to one’s vehicle can be a dangerous
journey, even on a school campus, yet this statute prevents a
vulnerable employee from protecting himself with a concealed
handgun.215 Such a deficiency could be viewed by a court as an
indication that this regulation is over-inclusive and therefore not
narrowly tailored to safety on school campuses.
ii. Rectifying the Contradiction
On the other hand, a distinction between these two different
provisions exists. The language of section 95.2(C)(8) indicates that
allowing a student to carry a gun to and from his car is an incidental
exception necessary to preserve the student’s right to possess a
firearm in his dorm room.216 Prohibiting a student from carrying his
firearm from his car to his campus residence would render his right
to possess a firearm in his dormitory meaningless. Without this
transportation exception, the statute would create a legal paradox
whereby a student would have to violate the law in order to exercise
his right to possess a firearm in his dorm room.
The key here is the statute’s recognition of the student’s right to
keep arms in his campus residence. In this sense, the Legislature has
211. See Video: Judiciary C Hearing on S.B. 303, supra note 154 for Professor
Maurice Franks’s explanation of some of the inconsistencies in Louisiana firearm
regulations.
212. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2(A) (2009) (reading in pertinent part:
“Carrying a firearm . . . by a student or nonstudent on school property . . . is
unlawful.”).
213. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(N)(11) (2009).
214. Id.
215. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES BY STATE BY UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE
(2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010
/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/table-9/10tbl09la.xls. 2010 crime rates are the most
recent data available.
216. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2(C)(8) (2009).

2013]

COMMENT

317

analogized a student’s dormitory to his home. Because the right to
self-defense is strongest within one’s home, a resident student must
be afforded the right to keep and bear arms in order to defend
himself and his property.217 Based on this reasoning, the school
employee is in a fundamentally different position than the resident
student. Although they may spend the majority of their time there,
professors do not live on campus and thus are not entitled to the
same core right of self-defense as the student.218 Nevertheless, a
court could recognize the school employee’s self-defense interest as
significant enough to outweigh the general objective of keeping
guns out of schools.219 This deficiency in the concealed handgun
permit statute could render it overbroad, and accordingly, a court
could strike down the school prohibition provision, section
40.1379.3(N)(11).220
The more likely result, however, would be for a court to
recognize the important distinction between the rights of a resident
student and the rights of a school employee. As in United States v.
Chester, a school employee does not fit firmly within the scope of
the core right221—the right of a law-abiding citizen to keep and bear
arms for the purpose of self-defense within the home.222 Unlike an
employee, a resident student maintains his private place of residence
in an on-campus dorm room,223 thus he or she carries a much
217. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (declaring that
the right to defense is most acute in the home).
218. This point raises another possible gap in section 14:95.2. It is possible that
a school employee may live on campus. The statute is silent on whether a resident
employee would enjoy the same right to possess a firearm in his residence as a
student. Although the law is silent on this point, a court could logically place a
resident employee in the same position as a resident student. Both share the same
core right to keep arms for defense of themselves and their property, which in this
case is on a school campus.
219. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (stating that all citizens have the right to keep
and bear arms for the purpose of self defense).
220. See supra Part I.B.
221. Note that if the employee does maintain residence on the school campus
then he or she would fit into the core right. See supra Part II.C (discussing the core
right).
222. See supra Part II.C (discussing the core right). Although a Louisiana court
has not expressly defined the core right in this way, the leading Second
Amendment jurisprudence since Heller has done so. Federal cases will be
persuasive precedent in a Louisiana court’s first application of strict scrutiny to a
gun regulation challenge such as this. It is also important to note that the Louisiana
Legislature has implicitly acknowledged this core right as indicated by the
reservation of a resident student’s right to keep firearms in his dorm room found in
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.2(C)(8).
223. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. A dorm room falls within the meaning of
“home and hearth.” The dorm room is a student’s place of residence, thus it is his
or her “home.” See discussion supra Part II.A.
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stronger constitutionally protected right to keep and bear arms on
campus, which the Legislature has recognized in this statute.224 Such
an inconsistency should not render this provision an over-inclusive
restriction that undermines the purpose of public safety by keeping
handguns off of school campuses. Rather, this illustrates the
Legislature’s recognition of an evolving right to keep and bear arms.
They have narrowly tailored both sections 14:95.2 and 40:1379.3
together to effectively maintain campus security while ensuring that
resident students can enjoy their constitutionally protected rights.
iii. Additional Tailoring
As a more general matter, section 40.1379.3 possesses other
important specifications and exceptions that tailor it to the state
interest of public safety. Section 40.1379.3(N)(11) is limited in
scope to “any school, school campus, or school bus.”225 Section
14:95.6(C)(1) defines “school” as a “public or private elementary,
secondary, high school, or vocational-technical school, college, or
university in this state,” 226 and “school campus” as “all facilities and
property within the boundary of the school property.”227 Excluded
from the statute is any termed “firearm free zone,” which is defined
as “any school campus and the area within one thousand feet of any
such school campus.”228 As originally enacted, section 40.1379.3
included this firearm-free-zone restriction, but it was removed by a
2010 legislative amendment.229 If the statute still included the
firearm-free zone limitation, a strong argument could be posited
against this remedy as an overbroad restriction.230 As the Legislature
came to realize, there are many cities in Louisiana where it is nearly
impossible to not be within 1,000 feet of a school.231 Thus, such a
restriction would render the concealed handgun permit statute
useless. Accordingly, this provision was removed from the statute
resulting in a more viable, narrowly tailored regulation.
Additionally, if again read in pari materia with section 14:95.2,
there are additional exceptions to the school concealed handgun ban.
224. In Heller, the Supreme Court struck down the D.C. handgun ban because
it extended “to the home, where the need for defense of self, family and property is
most acute.” 554 U.S. at 628.
225. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 (2009).
226. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.6(C)(1) (2009).
227. Id. § 14:95.6(C)(2).
228. Id. § 14:95.6(A).
229. 2010 Amendment H.B. 556 Act 925.
230. Hetzner, supra note 56, at 359.
231. Id. This restriction left people living near schools without the ability to
defend themselves when walking dogs, exercising, etc.

2013]

COMMENT

319

For example, it remains lawful to possess a firearm contained
entirely within a vehicle on a school campus.232 It is also lawful for
a student to possess a firearm whenever necessary for a class or
activity authorized by a university, including carrying the firearm to
and from that class.233 Each of these exceptions remains consistent
with the goal of campus and public safety while allowing qualified
citizens to freely exercise their fundamental rights.
Based on the compelling state interest of avoiding violence on
school campuses and the narrowly tailored means of achieving that
goal, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1379.3 stands a
promising chance of surviving a strict scrutiny review. The
Legislature has taken adequate measures to ensure that the statute
restricts only behavior that is necessary to achieve its goal of
providing safety on school campuses. In doing so, the Legislature
has left untouched behavior falling within the scope of the core right
of self-defense, as well as any activities attendant to educational
needs.234 Not only does the statute serve a compelling state interest,
but it does so in a fashion narrowly tailored to that state interest
sufficient to justify its infringement of Louisiana’s fundamental
right to bear arms.
C. Firearm Possession for Felons
Just as Louisiana regulates how one is permitted to use a firearm
and where one can carry a firearm, the state also has laws that
dictate who is permitted to possess a firearm. One such regulation is
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.1, which prohibits persons
convicted of certain felonies from possessing firearms.235 This law
holds generally that violent criminals, as well as sex offenders and
violators of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance Law, are
prohibited from owning or possessing firearms.236 Similar felony
weapon bans are common throughout the country among both state
232. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2(C)(5) (2009). In this provision, the
Legislature declares that it does not have the power to regulate the right to possess
a firearm in one’s vehicle. Id. Again, this is evidence of the Legislature’s implicit
recognition of a core right to keep and bear arms that it cannot restrict. Apparently,
it believes that this core right extends to a private vehicle. See supra note 222.
233. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2(C)(7), (8) (2009).
234. Id.
235. Id. § 14: 95.1(A).
236. Id. Although not inherently violent crimes, drug crimes are included in
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.1(A) because there is a strong correlation
between drugs and violence in society. See Lana Harrison & Joseph Gfroerer, The
Intersection of Drug Use and Criminal Behavior: Results from the National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 422, 439 (1992) (finding
drug use to be a strong correlate to violent crime in the United States).
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and federal laws; consequently, they have frequently been the
subject of Second Amendment constitutional challenges.237 On its
face, section 14:95.1 contradicts the new article I, section 11 of the
Constitution of Louisiana, which declares that all citizens have the
fundamental right to keep and bear firearms; therefore, this
regulation must be subject to strict scrutiny review upon judicial
challenge.238 However, because this regulation is narrowly tailored
to a compelling state interest, it is equipped to pass strict scrutiny
review.
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.1 provides: “It is
unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of
violence . . . to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon.”239
This statute imposes a firearm prohibition against any person who
has been convicted of a violent crime or other certain felonies in the
preceding ten years.240 Not only does the statute ban basic firearm
possession, but it also denies a felon eligibility to register for a
concealed handgun permit;241 consequently, it must be subject to
strict scrutiny.242
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 14:95.1 in State v. Amos. In Amos, the
Supreme Court applied a “reasonable and legitimate” test in
examining the regulation.243 The court stated in its opinion that
“such regulation is constitutionally permissible as a reasonable and
legitimate exercise of police power.”244 Under strict scrutiny,
however, simply being reasonable and legitimate will not be a
sufficient ground for constitutionality. Instead, the court will need to
237. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2010).
238. LA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
239. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2009). A “crime of violence” is defined
as:
an offense that has, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another, and that,
by its very nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense or an offense that involves the possession or use
of a dangerous weapon.
Id. § 14:2(B).
240. “Firearm” is defined as “any pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun,
submachine gun, black powder weapon, or assault rifle, which is designed to fire
or is capable of firing fixed cartridge ammunition or from which a shot or
projectile is discharged by an explosion.” Id. § 14:95.1(D).
241. Id. § 14:95.1.
242. LA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
243. State v. Amos, 343 So. 2d 166, 168 (La. 1977).
244. Id. (noting that courts of other states with comparable statutes and right to
bear arms constitutional provisions have made similar conclusions about their
lawfulness).
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identify a compelling state interest, and the statute will have to be
necessary or narrowly tailored to that interest.245
1. Compelling State Interest
As is the case with most gun regulations, by restricting the
possession of firearms from convicted felons, the state is trying to
curb gun-related violence in order to protect social peace and
safety.246 In an effort to ensure safety, the Louisiana Legislature has
restricted the possession of firearms from persons who “have
demonstrated a dangerous disregard for the law and present a
potential threat of further or future criminal activity.”247 Many
courts have noted that statistics reveal felons, such as domestic
abusers, are especially inclined to recidivism.248 They pose a unique
risk to society, and thus their access to firearms should be limited.249
Accordingly, protecting peace and safety by limiting felons from
gun possession can rather convincingly amount to a compelling state
interest.250
2. Guidance Toward a Narrowly Tailored Means
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.1 is also narrowly
tailored to the state objective of protecting peace and safety by
245. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (defining the strict
scrutiny standard of review).
246. See Amos, 343 So. 2d at 168 (recognizing the state’s interest in protecting
public health, safety, and morals or general welfare by prohibiting convicted
felons from possessing firearms); see also U.S. v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642–45
(7th Cir. 2010). In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that the government’s objective of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits the
possession of a firearm by anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence, was to prevent “armed mayhem.” Id. at 642. The court concluded that
preventing this class of criminals from possessing firearms maintained a
substantial relationship with the government’s objective of preventing armed
mayhem. Id.
247. Amos, 343 So. 2d at 168.
248. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 644.
249. See id. (citing a study that asserts that domestic assaults with firearms are
approximately 12 times more likely to end in the victim’s death than are assaults
without firearms); United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Irrespective of whether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown
manifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly complain of the
limitation on his liberty when his possession of firearms would otherwise threaten
the security of his fellow citizens.”).
250. See United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 804 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that the state’s objective of keeping firearms out of the hands of
domestic abusers because of the credible threat they posed to those around them
was a compelling government objective).

322

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

keeping firearms out of the hands of dangerous criminals. Its
narrowly tailored qualities are especially apparent in light of issues
raised in two recent cases addressing similar statutes. In United
States v. Skoien, the appellant contended that a lifetime
disqualification from gun possession due to his past domestic abuse
conviction, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), was overbroad
because the propensity for violence among domestic abusers
declines with an increase in age.251 Although the Seventh Circuit
rejected this argument as applied to the appellant in this case,252 the
court recognized the potential viability of a challenge by a
misdemeanant who has since been law abiding.253 Based on the
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, it is possible that prohibiting a nonviolent criminal from possessing firearms may fail to meet the
substantial relationship standard of intermediate scrutiny and thus
would be even more likely to fail the narrowly tailored standard of
strict scrutiny.254
The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in
Britt v. State.255 Here, the claimant challenged the constitutionality
of a lifetime prohibition of gun possession for convicted felons.256
The plaintiff had previously pled guilty to felony possession with
the intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance.257 The court
noted that this crime was non-violent and did not involve the use of
a firearm.258 In addition, it noted that in the 30 years since his drug
possession charge, the plaintiff had not been convicted of any other
crimes, nor had any agency or court made a determination that he
was violent, potentially dangerous, or more likely than the general
public to commit a crime with a firearm.259 Based on these facts, and
because the statute in question provided no possible exceptions to its
251. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 644. In other words, statistically, as the appellant
grows older, the chances of him committing another abuse offense will decline.
252. Id. at 645. The appellant, Skoien, had been convicted twice of domestic
battery and arrested while in possession of multiple guns just one year after his
second conviction. Id. See also United States v. Solerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)
(stating that a person to whom a statute properly applies cannot obtain relief based
on arguments that a differently situated person might present).
253. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 645. See also United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168,
174 (3rd Cir. 2011) (making the same point that a statute prohibiting the
possession of a weapon by a law-abiding, non-violent criminal may be an
improper infringement of a Second Amendment right).
254. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 646.
255. Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 321 (N.C. 2009).
256. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-415.1(a) (Westlaw 2013) (“It shall be
unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own,
possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any firearm.”).
257. Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 321.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 322.
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firearm ban, the court concluded that the statute was an
“unreasonable” regulation and “not fairly related” to the
preservation of public peace and safety, thereby it constituted a
violation of the plaintiff’s right to keep and bear arms as enumerated
in the North Carolina Constitution.260
3. Distinguishing Louisiana’s Law
Considering these two decisions, there are several key
characteristics that comparatively distinguish Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 14:95.1 as a narrowly tailored regulation. As
opposed to the North Carolina statute, which was a general firearms
ban for any person convicted of a felony, section 14:95.1 limits its
ban to those persons convicted of a crime of violence, sex offenders
and violators of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance
Law.261 Also, section 14:95.1 includes a time limit of ten years from
the date the sentence is completed for the applicability of the ban,
whereas the North Carolina statute, as well as the federal statute in
Skoien, both involved an unconditional lifetime ban from
firearms.262
These substantive measures in the law give Louisiana’s firearm
ban a significant edge in constitutional viability. Both of the chief
concerns raised by the North Carolina Supreme Court263 are
addressed in section 14:95.1: a narrow focus on certain felons and a
temporal restriction on the ban.264 Not only does such a regulation
attempt to take guns out of the hands of violent criminals, but it does
260. Id. at 323; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30. The language of this section is
identical to that of the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
of America. Also note, the dissent in this case points out that the majority cites no
direct authority or precedent to support its opinion. Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 325
(Timmons-Goodson, J. dissenting). The dissent argues that it is the responsibility
of the legislature to make laws in the interest of public welfare and safety, and
policy decisions such as these should be left up to the executive and legislative
branches. Id. He also emphasized that this decision will open the floodgates to
individual challenges to statutes prohibiting firearm possession by incompetents
and the mentally insane. Id.
261. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2009). The statute provides a list of
specific felonies contemplated by the ban. Id. Also note that in State v. Cobb, as an
example, the court determined that the distribution of marijuana was a crime
sufficient to meet the threshold of this statute. 428 So. 2d 935, 936 (La. Ct. App.
1983). The defendant’s appeal against the charge of felony in possession of a
firearm was dismissed. Id. at 937.
262. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-415.1 (Supp. 2007) (Westlaw 2013); United
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:95.1(C).
263. Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 323.
264. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2009).
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so in a specifically tailored fashion. Only individuals convicted of
particularly dangerous felonies are susceptible to punishment under
this statute, and the effects of this regulation expire after ten years
from the date of completion of the sentence in the absence of
subsequent felony convictions.265 Targeting only those criminals
who have shown a propensity for serious crime is a calculated effort
to keep guns away from those people who have proven to be the
most dangerous in society, thereby making the state a safer place.266
Placing a ten-year limit on the statute’s applicability also facilitates
this objective. If a violent criminal can remain law abiding for a
continuous ten-year period, then he or she has presumably displayed
strong signs of reform, and such a criminal does not pose the same
threat of violence as one with a more recent conviction.267 Both of
these statutory elements sufficiently narrow the scope of this
regulation and, in turn, strengthen its constitutional viability in light
of strict scrutiny.268
4. The Core Right Analysis
In addition, when assessing the constitutionality of a statute that
prohibits a felon’s possession of a firearm, the jurisprudence of the
federal circuit courts compel the application of a core right
analysis.269 Because it is federal jurisprudence, Louisiana courts are
not bound by this analysis; however, considering the federal circuit
courts’ extensive experience dealing with Second Amendment
challenges in the wake of Heller, this methodology may prove a
helpful guide to Louisiana courts in addressing the new strict
scrutiny mandate.270 Because of the gravity of the revised article I,
section 11, Louisiana courts will not likely have the luxury of
265. Id. Louisiana courts have held that the ten-year cleansing period can be
interrupted by committing any felony, not only the felonies enumerated in
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.1(A). State v. Batiste, 701 So. 2d 729,
733 (La. Ct. App. 1997), writ denied, 740 So. 2d 648 (La. 1999).
266. See supra note 249.
267. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 645; State v. Glover, 997 So. 2d 137 (La. Ct. App.
2008).
268. In addition to these two tailored features of Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 14:95.1, Louisiana courts have created a jurisprudential exception to this
firearm restriction in the form of an affirmative defense for a felon in possession
of a firearm. If the felon can prove an imminent threat of force from another with
no reasonable alternative to possession of the firearm, he may justify his
possession of a firearm for self-defense. See State v. Qualls, 921 So. 2d 226, 237
(La. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Recard, 704 So. 2d 324, 327–29 (La. Ct. App. 1997),
writ denied, 805 So. 2d 200 (La. 1998).
269. See supra Part II.C.
270. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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revisiting Louisiana’s prior right to bear arms jurisprudence.271
Instead, the strict scrutiny mandate demands a break from the past
and a wholly new analysis of the right.272
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
identified the core Second Amendment right as the right of a lawabiding citizen to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense
within the home.273 The statute in question regulates the possession
and use of firearms by persons convicted of certain felonies.274 This
is a blanket prohibition, thus extending to the use of weapons within
the home.275 In so doing, this restriction offends the traditional
notion of self-defense that Heller described as the foundation of our
right to keep and bear arms.276 However, the statute applies to
felons, not law-abiding citizens. Accordingly, this regulatory
measure does not fall firmly within the scope of the core right.277
Because the statute does not infringe upon the core Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms, it does not trigger the
strongest Second Amendment protections.278 Because this statute
falls outside of the core right and because the Legislature has
tailored the statute by including both temporal and criminal
limitations, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.1 remains
constitutionally viable under a strict scrutiny review.279
V. CONCLUSION
Louisiana’s article I, section 11 constitutional amendment marks
the strongest expression of the right to bear arms to date for any
jurisdiction within the United States. Never before has any state
subjected its right to keep and bear arms to a strict scrutiny judicial
review. Despite any reservations, Louisiana courts must now
271. See discussion supra Part III.C.
272. See discussion supra Part III.C.
273. See supra Part II.C.
274. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2009).
275. Id.
276. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008) (discussing
the natural right of self-defense).
277. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010). The
Fourth Circuit came to this same conclusion about a law prohibiting gun
possession by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
278. The Legislature typically has more liberty to regulate any behavior that
does not involve law-abiding citizens. See supra Part II.C.
279. See discussion supra Part II.C. Also, restricting firearms from felons was
a regulation included in Heller’s list of presumptively lawful regulatory measures.
Although Louisiana courts are not bound by Heller, the Supreme Court’s
endorsement may serve as additional support for this statute. See Heller, 554 U.S.
at 626–27.
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abandon their longstanding right to bear arms jurisprudence in lieu
of a daunting strict scrutiny standard of review, which they have
never before applied to firearm challenges. This unexplored scrutiny
has now become the judicial gauge by which courts will evaluate a
Louisiana citizen’s right to bear arms. No hallow restriction will be
able to slip through the judicial cracks. The battle lines have been
drawn, but the fate of Louisiana gun laws is far from sealed. Despite
the severity of strict scrutiny, any regulation that is carefully drafted
pursuant to a compelling public interest is poised to pass a strict
scrutiny review. In the flood of challenges that will inevitably follow
this amendment, courts will soon have the opportunity to address
these concerns. The Legislature has passed the regulatory torch to
the judiciary. The fate of Louisiana’s gun regulations is now in its
hands.
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